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Scandal and moral transgression
This paper explores the relationship between the public disclosure of wrongdoing and the social construction of transgression and moral meanings.
It analyses a range of public reactions and commentaries to a public confession of having been an informer for the former Romanian secret police.
The paper reflects on how social actors in the public sphere constitute morality and issues of transgressive behavior. It reveals how a public space of argument and judgment is constituted by drawing upon various interpretive procedures and sociocultural resources, and lay versions of morality that social actors mobilize. Largely due to the influence of mass-media, public reactions to transgression or wrongdoing are usually understood and explored through the (over)use of terms such as 'scandal' (Thompson, 2000) , with issues and discussions of damaged or difficult reputation (Fine, 2001) , public opinion and trust ) not far behind. One usually speaks of 'scandal' by referring to 'public and media perceptions of specific behaviors and events that deserve moral opprobrium' (Fine, 2001: 131) . The political scandal is usually considered the archetype of the public scandal.
Psychologists have considered public reactions to scandal and moral transgression in terms of 'motivated reasoning' (Fischle, 2002) , the desire to preserve or protect existing beliefs and prior affect and various other cognitive and emotional mechanisms that facilitate and influence social perception and social categorization (Schwarz and Bless, 1992; Bless et al., 2000) . Others have focused on causal attribution and political accountability (Eagly and Chaiken, 1976) , third-person judgments and mass-media issue framing (Joslyn, 2003) or predictors of evaluative responses to allegations of political misconduct (Gonzales et al., 1995) . Psychological research on public reactions to transgression takes the reasoning individual as its unit of analysis and tends to underplay the role of communication patterns in understanding moral transgression and responses to it. Moral reasoning is considered to be the expression (and outcome) of cognitive and emotional mental processes.
There is a sociology of scandal as there is a media and communication theorizing of scandal (Adut, 2008; Thompson, 2000) . Among other issues, sociologists have focused on the moral nature of political scandals (Jacobsson and Löfmarck, 2008) , scandals as morality tales/plays (Gamson, 2001; Jiménez, 2004) . Scandals are understood as rituals and a 'confrontation between various systems of norms' (Jacobsson and Löfmarck, 2008: 203) , instances of the existence or non-existence of polarization in society (Alexander, 1988) . Scandals as rituals are sociologist's litmus test, they can serve as 'detectors of norms' (Neckel, 2005) , reminders of society's 'underlying system of values and norms' (Jacobsson and Löfmarck, 2008: 208) .
Media and communication theorists have offered a more thorough consideration of the relationship between political scandals and media (see, inter alia, Tumber and Waisbord, 2004; Schudson, 2004) . For communication theorists scandals are "socially selected-or constructed-communication patterns. They can be defined as intense political communication about a real or imagined defect that is by consensus condemned and meets universal indignation or outrage" (Esser and Hartung, 2004, p. 1065) . From the political and sexual vagaries of American presidents (Schudson, 2004) to media constructions of ethnic minority identity (Erjavec, 2003) , moral language in the public sphere and associated issues of moral transgression are constituted in communication and media practices. These practices mediate the relationship between the actor(s) involved, the act and the audience/public, and include (but are not limited to) styles of media reporting (Brezina and Phipps, 2010) media gatekeeping and agenda-setting Delli Carpini, 2000, 2004) , the link between scandals and political culture (Esser and Hartung, 2004) , political image restoration and communication strategies (Blaney and Benoit, 2001 ).
The identification of aspects of individual cognitive functioning, systems of norms, and detailing the media ritual of news making (production and reception) and communication patterns (circulating and circulated in the public sphere) are seen as crucial ways to consider the shape and direction that moral reasoning takes, the construction of moral meanings and commentaries on transgressive behaviour. Yet, what makes a scandal a scandal, and why particular instances of behaviour are sometimes categorized as 'transgressive', 'scandalous', 'outrageous' is not always treated as an issue for social actors to negotiate and ratify. There is less interest in how social actors use culturally available discursive resources for explaining events, people, social relations and how these are actually used in argument. What is needed is a careful study of transgression (and meanings attached to it) as 'inevitable component of community life' (Prus and Grills, 2003: 4) . Moral transgressions and public responses to it cannot be satisfactorily understood outside of actors, actions and audiences, social, moral and political contexts that frame these issues and everyday thinking about wrongdoing (Darley, 1992) . A public space of judgment does not pre-exist socio-communicative occasions of use, but rather is constituted in and through sociocommunicative practices of arguing and thinking about personal and group identity, transgression and the morality of behaviour (Billig, 1996) 1 .
Traditional 'struggles over symbolic power' (Thompson, 2000) , issues of reputation, respectability and trust, are matters that can be studied through an analysis of (public) discourse and the 'conditions of responsibility' under which individuals are considered by others to be morally accountable for accounts and actions (Douglas, 1970) . Social actors can draw on 'multidimensional social resources' (Schudson, 2004) such as trust and reputation, a range of discursive devices 2 , textual networks of testimonies and opinion (public and private), rumours, official documents, and so on to construct version of events, to account for particular dispositions to act in a particular way, to manage personal, group or institutional responsibility, to deny or manage accountability for actions, and so on. In doing so, they construct, mobilize, defend different versions of lay morality and moral meanings 3 .
Deviance, morality and the reactions of others
Discourse and socio-communicative interaction plays a crucial role in situating others and ourselves in various "ethical spaces" and under the sphere of "ethical questions" (Taylor, 1989) . Before a society or public can come to a consensus of condemnation and indignation or outrage, social actors need to engage with and construct moral stances and repertoires of morality (Breit, 2010; Tileagă, 2010) . Moral stances and repertoires of morality are "always present in dialogue and discourse, at different levels and in different forms" (Linell and Rommetveit, 1998: 466) . Studying public morality and moral reasoning entails a closer look at the morality and social construction of deviance (Ben-Yehuda, 1990; Cohen, 1980; Goode and Ben-Yehuda, 2009; Thompson, 1998) and moral language that constructs deviance (Cowburn, 2010; Hunt, 1997) . This has usually involved, to a higher or lesser degree, a focus on media itself, but less attention was paid to lay meanings of morality and moral meanings communicated and displayed in public responses to moral transgression. Public responses to moral transgression are not simply ways of relating or explaining transgression and morality; they are essentially constitutive of and continuously (re)shaping the relationship between transgression and morality.
Indignation, outrage, disgust, disbelief, are just some reactions to moral transgression. Reactions to moral transgression can take many forms, ranging from the extreme, where moral transgression can be associated with the dehumanization of the person and has oppressive effects (Tileagă, 2007) to accountability in courts (Atkison and Drew, 1979) , telephone conversations (Drew, 1998) , police interrogations (Edwards, 2006; Stokoe, 2010) or neighbor relations (Stokoe and Edwards, 2008) . Various reactions to transgression provide opportunities for moral positioning and the display of moral reasoning (Cromby et al., 2010; Tileagă, 2010) 4 .
An absolutist view on deviance and social responses (Hendershott, 2002) sees social meanings in general (including moral meanings) as part of 'some necessary being that is timeless, eternal, external, and independent' (Douglas, 1970: 10) of people. In absolutist perspectives, deviance is seen as essentially harmful, undermining the social order. An absolutist view of deviance and morality 'overlooks the fundamental importance of people in deciding what is deviant … overlooks the diversity of deviance' (Higgins, 2008: 16) . In contrast, a constructionist/interactional view on deviance explores the processes in society that create deviance, how deviance is socially constructed, organized and negotiated (Adler and Adler, 2000; Rubington and Weinberg, 2007) . Interactional approaches to deviance contend that 'forms of behavior per se do not differentiate deviants from nondeviants; it is the responses of the conventional and conforming members of the society who identify and interpret behavior as deviant which sociologically transform persons into deviants' (Kitsuse, 1962: 253; see also Erikson, 1962; Becker, 1973; Lemert, 1974) . If deviance is 'no more nor less than the way an act is received' then one can conduct detailed empirical observations on the act by 'observing its reception ' (McHugh, 1970: 81) . In order to achieve that, researchers of deviance can invoke a range of contextual, political, cultural factors that may help interpret the reaction of others 5 .
Understanding deviance and the reactions of others presupposes close attention not only to the way an act is received, how it is labeled and subsequently judged, but to how deviance (transgression) and moral meanings are linked by members of society in their everyday lives (Douglas, 1970 (Bergmann, 1998; Linell and Rommetveit, 1998; Sneijder and te Molder, 2005) . This paper argues for studies of the social construction of deviance and moral meanings in naturally occurring socio-communicative contexts, studies focused on collective and interactional processes of constructing moral transgression (and audience reaction) in its own right (see Lynch and Bogen, 1996; Eglin and Hester, 2003; Rapley et al., 2003) . Deviant action (and its interpretation) is intertwined in lay beliefs and reproduced in and through ordinary language. An act "becomes a transgression only in and through being taken up and sometimes indeed described precisely as a transgression" (Linell and Rommetveit, 1998: 466) . Offering a culturally adequate explanation of moral transgression is linked to the contingency of the public sphere, where different opinions can be held, moral quandaries and ideological dilemmas exist.
Coming to terms with individual and collective past
Various socio-political contexts across the world have offered social ranging from open letters sent to newspapers to avowals of 'collaboration' in media news interviews. In most cases, they have required (and invited) public reaction; they were part of a wider category of actions that were not explanatory transparent and required explanation in order to be understood.
They were usually perceived as moves to preserve self-esteem or save face , but less as social performances engendering their own dialogical context, public response and associated social and ideological consequences for self and others.
Data are part of a wider project looking at the social construction of totalitarian/post-totalitarian past in talk and text (cf. Tileagă, 2008 Tileagă, , 2009a 2011, in press ) and especially at the social production of disclosure and reconciliation with the past in public avowals of 'collaboration' with the 
Analytic approach
Ethnomethodology and discursive psychology conceive of sociocommunicative practice as moral order (Jayyusi 1991; Edwards 2003) . The analysis takes a discursive and ethnomethodological analytic focus (Edwards, 2005 (Edwards, , 2006 Eglin and Hester, 2003; Lynch and Bogen, 1996) The focus is on understanding the social organization of moral and political accountability by pointing to various lay sociocultural resources that operate in social/public settings and actions (such as passing a public judgment on a matter of transgression). The focus is on the locally generated interpretive 1 4
procedures, locally contingent moral reasoning that serves some purpose:
setting the scene of the 'morality play', proffering an accusation or defence, painting an image of the person, explaining behaviour and context, discounting responsibility, and so on.
Analysis
The analysis points to the existence of a variety of interpretive procedures that 
Psychological categories, motives and public morality
The preliminary contours of public morality are drawn in terms of psychological reactions. These are prompted by the way the issue is introduced to readers on the front page. The main headline and sub-headline on the main page read:
[1] "Those informed on by Antohi are shocked and silent"
[2] "Sorin Antohi's confession on his collaboration with the Securitate has engendered a lot of reactions. Those probably concerned by his information notes prefer, as a general rule, to remain silent".
The main headline's use of psychological language works to create a 1 5
world-picture where accountability for actions (informing on someone) and actors (the 'informer' and those informed on) engender moral responses and reactions. Moral responses are framed using everyday psychological categories ('shock' and 'silence'). These categories qualify the public response as a psychological attitude; their co-location implicitly tells something about the social object being reacted to. There is an implicit orientation in the headline to 'shock' and 'silence' psychologically fitting together as reasonable forms of response. This is not simply a matter of 'referring to private mental states but, rather, are part of how actions and actors are made publicly accountable' (Locke and Edwards, 2003: 253 [3] "Sorin Antohi is judged with leniency and severity"
[4] "The confession of the CEU historian regarding his past has engendered numerous reactions amongst the leading intelligentsia in Romania"
In They are not merely references to inner, psychological processes, but ways of talking that have public currency and used in managing accountability (Edwards, 2005; Lynch and Bogen, 1996) .
[5] "I write these lines with great pain in my heart. For me Sorin Antohi was and remains a dear friend, a person of spirit, an unflinching democrat"
[6] "It's been 24 hours since I received Sorin's letter, I cannot quite come to my senses. I knew he had "file problems", a few months ago I was even certain, but I was shocked of what he went through, starting at 17 years of age"
[7] "I am perplexed and saddened. At the moment I am too shocked to comment coherently Sorin Antohi's confession. It's good he had the strength to do it, even if so late"
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The use of everyday psychological categories ('pain', 'shock', 'perplexed', 'saddened') mediates a realistic moral concern around the discrepancy between reality and expectations, and the counter-intuitive, unexpected nature of the news and the act. They do not refer to private mental states but rather index the person's (initial) stance, moral reaction: some values, norms, attitudes have been breached. They can also be seen as attending to possible common sense inferences and rhetorical alternatives at stake in the reporting (cf. Edwards, 2005) .
What the reactions make visible is a moral order of social judgment where Antohi's eligibility for social intercourse with others is reassessed. For some commentators moral transgression is constituted trough locating it in an actor endowed with particular characteristics and moral character (hypocrisy, opportunism, duplicity) and driven by immoral 'motives'
(desire to avoid external detection, self-seeking, self-serving, dissimulation).
[8] "the so-called "confession of the great intellectual", spilled melodramatically in the media, now, that his uncovering was imminent, it is just the most recent indication of the hypocrisy with which Sorin Antohi treats his public, his friends and himself" [9] "That he is one of the most valuable Romanian intellectuals … does not erase the simple and incontrovertible fact … that he is a disgusting scoundrel, completely self-seeking and self-serving"
[10] "Why is it so hard to understand that Sorin Antohi is an opportunist through and through, raised with communist morals and models. Once a traitor, always a traitor… he knew that his day of reckoning was near when people will find out what human stuff he is made of"
[11] "I had enough of morally corrupted intellectuals and opinion leaders, who … spend their time hiding the black blots from their file, with the required duplicity meant to gain them an advantage over the concrete reality and their fellow others stuck in unprofitable principles … it would be better to pity those who have been the true victims of the Securitate, and not of their own opportunism"
The public act of confessing wrongdoing is seen as a confirmation of an already existing moral character and motivational constellation of traits which are, now, surfacing. 'some unified core' on which one can pass moral judgment (Hitlin, 2008: 4) .
This means judging the person by ignoring alternative descriptions of the act, person or situation, and seeing 'only those deeds and qualities that confirm the malefactor's transformed identity' (Fine, 2001: 35) . A 'moral essence' is [12] "Anothi's letter surfaces in a moment where rumours regarding his collaboration with the Securitate have risen in intensity … The confession of the historian Sorin Antohi is a very intelligent defence where the pressure from the Securitate becomes the main justification for being an informer... It is therefore an act without moral significance"
[13] "I think that an intellectual becomes a lesser person when he renounces principles and starts to calculate (that he may lose his job, that he won't be able to get his kids to the best schools, etc)"
[14] ""This is clearly a disaster minimization strategy. He said to himself: the shit will hit the fan, better take an umbrella"
[15] "A failing can be forgiven, but hiding it for so long, and writing about it only under Damocles's sword cancels the effect it would have had if it would have been done out of conscience at the right time"
Comments engender a reductionist logic of morality where simply 2 0 observing the 'facts', the external situation, one can simply infer the character It is the relative moral standing of the person in society not the act in itself that is the source of justification for moral judgment. It is only in this way that 'an offender can be forgiven even if the offence cannot be forgotten' (Margalit, 2002: 199) .
[16] "I congratulate Mr Antohi for his confession… from now on I see
him as a free person -because he has told the truth and truth liberated him. I congratulate him for confessing, this tells me that his conscience has remained untouched"
Judaeo-Christian ethics and morality is used as a resource for passing a judgment; it creates a humanistic orientation and framework of social judgment: by confessing and telling the truth the offender is liberated.
According to Judaeo-Christian ethics someone's ability to confess and feel remorse attests that the person is not essentially 'corrupt'. Through confession the person assumes responsibility for the deed and thus creates a distance between the act and the doer. The account in [16] draws on a very specific culturally available metaphor and image of redemption (truth as redemptive) in order to manage moral character and motive. This is part of a wider collection of culturally available metaphors and images with roots in Judaeo-Christian ethics.
[17] "Every saint has a past, every sinner has a future" a saying goes. What Sorin Antohi has achieved starting from the 80s, so after the period in which he was an informer, for the salvation of the dignity of Romanian culture cannot be sponged over by philistine indignation"
[18] "Those who will throw the stone at him should know that, freeing himself through confession, Antohi has unburdened himself of a weightier stone -the one from his own soul"
[19] "I am not going to throw the stone at Antohi … I don't think we should judge these revelations in terms of disappointment: in as far as the risks of deconspiration are concerned, we know where we are coming from, where we are going, and what obstacles need to be removed" [20] "Choosing, at last, to talk about his own degradation, Sorin Antohi is on the road to a too long postponed redemption"
[21] "Early? Late? How can we measure the time of pain, fear, shame? … Those who know the answer should throw the stone, cos' the hand needs a justification! … as with regards to mistakes? Who is without?"
[22] "... A person of his standing has fallen at some point (but it has also risen! … although not quite fully … as he confessed everything late)"
Social judgments that use Judaeo-Christian ethics as resource place the deed, the person and social judgment in human(istic) perspective. They state an obvious, taken for granted ethics, an ethics of thick human relations, a dialogical ethic, and not one based on formulaic accusations and unilateral moralization. They also express the possibility and the need of re-accession, the reestablishing of the relationship between social judge and offender.
Religious pictures and metaphors that express a relation to sin and redemption contain an underlying ontology about the reflexive relationship that one has with oneself and others. The issue of casting judgment and, especially, the entitlement to judge is at the core of Judaeo-Christian ethics. This is also available as a cultural resource to be used in the management of 2 3 moral accountability.
[23] "We, the moralist and moralizing people, I don't think we quite have our hands clean to accuse. Of course we can observe, we can know and we can evaluate, we can demand and we can draw conclusions. Maybe we could look at ourselves and show more decency"
[24] "To judge Antohi harshly, when I don't know who is sufficiently without stain to be able to do it, can only lead to a chronic environment of suspicion … to less togetherness, ultimately"
[25] "How many of the 20 million former Romanian socialist citizens could truly, looking at themselves, raise the stone and throw it at a child of 17 who has made a common choice under the sway of a state of mind very common at the time, fear"
Relying on Judaeo-Christian ethics and morality as a resource does not mean that a common-sense, objective conception of deviance is denied, but that it is replaced with a conception of deviance that originates in a humanistic orientation, one that starts with thick relations between people,
and not with motive, intention or personality. All these are views that suggest that true ethics and social judgment requires partiality, not impartiality. This proposes a normative view of shared morality that requires the recognition of the moral status of the judge (as well as that of the offender) and the wider premises of public morality.
From personal to political accountability
The questions that researchers of deviance ask are as relevant to them as they are to lay members of society. Is deviance harmful or helpful? What are its broader social and political effects? How much is out there (still undiscovered)? Both researchers of deviance and lay members of society usually contend that the answer to these questions does not make sense outside of social and ideological context. Coming to terms with the individual, personal past interweaves with coming to terms with the national, collective past. Some commentators treat this process as entailing the 'identification of the correct principles of morality as a project that must be carried out collectively by all those potentially affected by their adoption' (McMahon, 2000: 514) . Using the political and ideological context as explanatory and accounting device is one way in which the reacting public can manage this task.
The revelation of personal truths becomes a vehicle for revealing wider societal, political and ideological truths, and public concerns with 'knowing the truth'. In a way, commentators 'seek to accommodate both the desire to locate causal or moral responsibility in the actor himself, and the urge to locate causes in the wider society' (Eglin and Hester, 2003: 97) . They seek to accommodate an individual and collective dilemma of responsibility.
[26] "We must know the entrails of the dictatorial system and understand its enormity in order to establish the right measure of guilt"
[27] "We must know this past in order to get rid of it. Sorin Antohi is helping us. We should appreciate him for this and we need to move on. There is still a lot of work to do and there is no time to waste" This is a move from the particular case to the general state of affairs, from personal/individual to political and ideological accountability. Antohi's confession is accounted for in terms of an explanation and illumination of the wider ideological context of coming to terms with the communist past. Past wrongdoing does not solely say something about someone's personality, but rather something about issues and circumstances located in past and present political arrangements. It is the foundation for clarifying things, drawing conclusions around past responsibilities that are consequential to coming to terms with the past; the confession stands for something, it points to the 2 5 broader struggle of understanding the accountability of the past; ultimately, the confession is an instrument of moral and political action.
[28] "This biographical drift expresses the extreme pathology of a world (communist and postcommunist), more than a personal weakness"
[29] "Sorin Antohi's confession contributes to that moral clarity that I have constantly championed"
[30] "It seems to me that the merit of Sorin Antohi's confession is that it gives us the possibility to nuance things. We would have proceeded with axe in hand: those are bad, those are good"
[31] "The Sorin Antohi case is another argument for the condemnation of communism -we see, once more, the degree to which communism degraded people"
The context of coming to terms with the past is both foundation and criterion for moral judgment. It could be argued that this is a way through communication. This entails taking seriously the idea that "morality remains both a prerequisite and a product of the engagement in dialogue" (Linell and Rommetveit, 1998, p. 472) .
One must be able to describe the social organization of morality 'under which the members of society consider any concrete thing to be moral or immoral (approvable or disapprovable).' (Douglas, 1970: 12) . Such an analytic focus takes into account the intimate link between characterizations of actors and characterizations of acts, and between modes of explanation and the social construction of actor, actions and morality for situational, practical purposes. A discursive and ethnomethodological approach can help us describe in more detail the socio-psychological dynamic of production, recognition and reaction to moral transgression and the role of interpretive communities that constitute and display systems of moral categorizations, absolutist and relativist conceptions of deviance, normative rules and norms, moral categories and presuppositions for persons, events, institutions, political contexts, and so on. The character of moral reasoning on transgression in the public sphere is shaped in ways that can be said to reflect the different versions of everyday meanings of morality within a community.
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Notes 1. A scandal is a scandal, in the first place, not solely because individuals are known or discovered to have committed moral transgressions, but that in doing so a 'center of public attention and discourse' (Fine, 2001 : 131) is created. 'Political scandals' create (and sometimes, lead to the rehearsal of) vocabularies and frameworks for public discourse (cf. Schudson, 2004) , lay versions of morality and identity.
2. People commit acts they see as wrong and they use various discursive techniques to disavow deviance and present themselves as normal and the act in terms that are culturally appropriate and acceptable (Cromwell and Thurman, 2003; Overstreet and Yule, 2001; Scully and Marolla,1984; Sykes and Matza, 1957) . In the explanation of people and human action, social actors drawn upon 'vocabularies' of motive as explanatory devices (Mills, 1940; Blum and McHugh, 1971; Berard, 1998) .
3. Media 'scandal' discourses construct and mobilize various versions of lay morality and moral meanings through a shift from reporting the specific event that causes outrage (the individual´s own version of wrongdoing, his/her confession) to the contextualization and recontextualization (Wodak, 2011) of (seemingly related) more general concerns whose role is to help reveal the individual's 'real' agenda, concerns or vested interested in presenting a specific versions of events to the public: the 'moral character' of the individual and those around him, the moral 'culture' of the group, society, political party of which the wrongdoer is a member, analogies and extrapolations to others 'scandals', and so on. Such public discourses in the media, associated to the 0 3 0 short or long 'career' of a scandal, may involve considerable transformations and distortions.
4. The reaction of others, emotion, shame and concerns with integration/reintegration (Braithwaite, 1989) have the power to redefine people (and their activities), and sometimes lead them to abandon their 'respectable identities in favor of secondary deviation and deviant identities' (Best, 2004: 64 (Goode, 2004: 46-47) .
6. I have not divided the accounts I included in this paper in those of 'accusers' and 'defendants'. Not only is that a tricky operation, but also in doing so one would miss the variety of social positions available to and taken up by members of society. Is there is a tendency for accusers to draw upon 'absolutist' allegations (internal attributions of responsibility to the person and act), whereas defendants tend to draw upon 'contextualist' explanations (external attributions to the context in which the act was performed)? There is also the important question of the temporal distribution of responses to transgression, the temporal distribution of expressions of essentialist and relativist/contextualist stances. Do the former tend to be associated with
